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ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī (d. 898/1492) on the Eternity of the World1 
 
Ulrich Rudolph 
University of Zurich 
 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī is mainly known for his poetic works.2 One of his mathnawīs 
entitled Yūsuf u-Zulaykhā offers a fascinating interpretation of the well-known story of Joseph 
and ranks among the most celebrated epic poems ever written in the Persian language.3 When 
praising his talents, however, we should not forget that his interests were not confined to 
literature but extended to several areas of scholarship. Actually, Jāmī studied most of the 
sciences taught in the Islamic world at his time, his scholarly output being almost as 
impressive as his poetic writings. 
Jāmī was born in 817/1414 in the region of Jām, lying about midway between 
Mashhad and Herat. When he was still young his family moved to Herat where he began his 
education at the madrasa. Later on, he continued studying in Samarqand, which was at that 
time the centre of learning in the East of the Islamic world. In Samarqand, his curriculum was 
not restricted to the religious disciplines such as tafsīr, fiqh, and kalām but included the so-
called rational sciences as well. One of his favourite topics seems to have been mathematics 
and astronomy, which he studied under the famous Qāḍīzāda al-Rūmī at the observatory of 
Ulugh Beg. Apparently, Jāmī excelled in both disciplines. According to our sources, he was 
not only able to improve the writings of his own teacher, Qāḍīzāda al-Rūmī, but also to solve 
                                                 
1 This paper was delivered at Yale University on Dimitri Gutas’s birthday and dedicated to him. 
2 For a general introduction, see the article “Jāmi, ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān Nur-al-Dīn,ˮ Encyclopaedia Iranica, vol. 
XIV (New York, 2008), 469b-482a, which consists of three parts: i. Life and Works (P. Losensky), ii. Jāmi and 
Sufism (H. Algar), iii. Jāmi and Persian Art (Ch. Kia). Cf. also the unpublished Ph.D. Thesis by F.F.G. 
Schadchehr, Abd al-Rahman Jami: Naqshbandi Sufi, Persian Poet (The Ohio State University, 2008) and the 
introduction to N. Heer, The Precious Pearl: al-Jāmī’s al-Durrah al-Fākhirah (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1979). 
3 The text which is preserved in more than two hundred manuscripts has been printed several times, the best 
edition being probably the one prepared under the direction of A. Afsaḥzad, 2 vols. (Tehran: 1999). Cf. the 
English translation by D. Pendleburg, Yousuf and Zulaykha: an Allegorical Romance (London: Octagon Press, 
1980), which also contains an edition of the Persian text. 
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some obscure astronomical problems by the celebrated mathematician and astronomer ʿAlī al-
Qūšjī.4 
Despite these striking intellectual powers, Jāmī did not pursue a scholarly career. On 
the contrary: At a certain moment of his life, he is said to have abandoned his academic 
interests in order to devote himself to Sufism. The details of this conversion – if it actually 
was a conversion – are not very clear. What we are told by the biographical sources includes a 
variety of anecdotes combining religious motives with dream stories and an unsuccessful love 
affair. In any case, Jāmī was initiated into the Naqshbandī order and studied Sufi writings, in 
particular the works of Ibn al-ʿArabī, which were in high esteem among the Naqshbandīs. 
Furthermore, he decided to leave Samarqand and to return to Herat where he spent, apart from 
some travelling, the rest of his life.5 
Despite his orientation towards Sufism, Jāmī remained what we would nowadays call 
a public intellectual. He was introduced to the court of the princes at Herat and maintained a 
huge network of personal contacts, partly to other scholars, partly to persons who played an 
important role in politics in Eastern Iran.6 Besides, he continued to be a prolific author, in 
both Arabic and Persian, and in both poetry and prose.7 Some of his writings became 
widespread throughout Iran and beyond, contributing to the growth of his fame already during 
his lifetime. When Jāmī died in 898/1492, he was – and here I quote Paul Losensky – “the 
most renowned writer in the Persian-speaking world, receiving appreciation and payment for 
his works from as far as India and Istanbul.”8 
 
II 
                                                 
4 Heer, Precious Pearl, 1; Shadchehr, Abd al-Rahman Jami, 12. 
5 Art. “Jāmi,ˮ EIran, XIV, 469b (Losensky) and 475-479 (Algar); cf. Heer, Precious Pearl, 2, and Shadchehr, 
Abd al-Rahman Jami, 13-15. 
6 Art. “Jāmi,ˮ EIran, XIV, 470a (Losensky); cf. Shadchehr, Abd al-Rahman Jami, 54-62. 
7 A description of his major writings, in poetry as well as in prose, is given by Losensky in the art. “Jāmi,ˮ 
EIran, XIV, 470b-473a; cf. also Shadchehr, Abd al-Rahman Jami, 119-151, whose description is confined, 
however, to the poetic works. 
8 Art. “Jāmi,ˮ EIran, XIV, 470b. 
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Losensky’s statement is perfectly documented by the text which is at the focus of this 
article. It has its own long history which is quite unusual but narrowly connected to Jāmī’s 
fame as an outstanding scholar. In 878/1473 he went to Mecca in order to perform the ḥajj. 
On his return, he travelled via Damascus and Aleppo where he received an invitation from 
Mehmed II to come to Istanbul and teach there at one of the great madrasas recently founded 
by the Ottoman Sultan. Jāmī declined the invitation, although it was accompanied by a 
considerable amount of money. Yet, Mehmed insisted on getting in touch with the famous 
Persian scholar and sent, some years later, another messenger to Jāmī, this time all the way 
from Constantinople to Herat. The question transmitted by him was modest in comparison to 
the first request. For this time, Jāmī was not asked to come to the Ottoman court but only to 
write a book for the Ottoman Sultan. Therein, he should deal with the major differences to be 
found in the doctrines of the Sufis, the theologians and the philosophers.9 
Jāmī accepted the request and started examining the topic Mehmed II was interested 
in. The result of his examination is nothing else but the book which is at the focus of this 
article. Its title varies from manuscript to manuscript but two versions have become common 
among scholars. One of them is Risāla fī Taḥqīq madhhab al-ṣūfiyya wa-l-mutakallimīn wa-l-
ḥukamāʾ (A Treatise Dealing with the Verification of the Doctrines of the Sufis, the 
Theologians and the Philosophers), referring to the content of the book. The other one is al-
Durra al-fākhira (The Precious Pearl), referring to its goal, namely to find among all the 
doctrines that which is most precious, i.e. the truth.10 Unfortunately, Mehmed II had no 
chance to have a look into the book. Jāmī finished the text in 886/1481 and sent it to 
Constantinople but the Sultan died shortly before its arrival. In the long term, however, this 
did not affect the success of the Precious Pearl. It became widespread in Iran and in the 
                                                 
9 Heer, Precious Pearl, 3; art. “Jāmi,ˮ EIran, XIV, 470a-b (Losensky). 
10 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī, al-Durra al-fākhira, ed. N. Heer and M. Behbehani (McGill University in 
collaboration with Tehran University, 1980); English translation by Heer, Precious Pearl, 31-86; the various 
titles are discussed by Heer, Precious Pearl, 8-9. 
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Ottoman Empire, as documented by the huge number of manuscripts preserved.11 As a result, 
we are in the position to read an interesting testimony from the 9th/15th century Islamic world 
telling us much about the intellectual atmosphere and the debates being conducted at that 
time. 
As a matter of fact, al-Durra al-fākhira is interesting for several reasons. It can be read 
from several perspectives, each reflecting another problem and another context worth 
elucidating. One of these contexts is the tradition of learning connected to the writings and the 
thought of Ibn al-ʿArabī. As we have seen, Jāmī was deeply rooted in this tradition; it 
motivated him to abandon the rational sciences and remained the basis of his convictions and 
his intellectual activities throughout his life. Consequently, it would be interesting to compare 
his reflections to the statements of other adherents to the Great Master such as Ṣadr al-Dīn al-
Qūnawī (d. 673/1274), ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī (d. about 735-36/1335), Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī 
(d. 751/1350), ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī (d. 805/1403) and Muḥammad b. Ḥamza al-Fanārī (d. 
834/1431) in order to better understand his doctrinal position as well as the development of 
the school in general, in particular in Eastern Iran.12 
Another important context does not concern Iran but the Ottoman Empire. It is related 
to what might be called the religious and cultural politics of Mehmed II. As already 
mentioned, it was he who asked Jāmī to write al-Durra al-fākhira. Apparently, this idea was 
not a whim of the late Sultan but in perfect harmony with many instructions issued and 
activities undertaken by him during his reign. As is well-known, Mehmed founded several 
madrasas and was eager to reorganize the teaching of the sciences in the Ottoman Empire. In 
                                                 
11 Heer and Behbehani, Introduction to Jāmī, Durra, 12-18; cf. Heer, Precious Pearl, 11-16. The text is 
preserved in two versions: (a) a short version, which is probably the original text sent to Mehmed II; (b) a long 
version, representing probably the final redaction finished by Jāmī later on. The edition of the Arabic text as well 
as the English translation are based on the long version.  
12 A short survey of this tradition is given by J. Morris, “Ibn ʿArabi and His Interpreters. Part II: Influences and 
Interpretations,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 106 (1986), 733-756, and 107 (1987), 101-119, and 
W.C. Chittick, “The School of Ibn ʿArabī,” in History of Islamic Philosophy, eds. S.H. Nasr and O. Leaman, 2 
vols. (London/New York: Routledge, 1996), vol. 1, 510-523. Cf. also T. Winter, “Ibn Kemāl (d. 940/1543) on 
Ibn ʿArabī’s Hagiology,” in Sufism and Theology, ed. A. Shihadeh (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2007), 137-157, who discusses the impact of this tradition on the early Ottomans, and M. Rustom, The Triumph 
of Mercy: Philosophy and Scripture in Mullā Ṣadrā (Albany: State of New York University Press, 2012). 
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order to do so, he initiated public debates , such as the famous muḥākama between ʿAlī al-Dīn 
al-Ṭūsī (d. 677/1472 or 887/1482) and Khājazāda (d. 893/1488), which concerned the Tahāfut 
al-falāsifa written by al-Ġazālī.13 The debate was characterized by a comparatist approach: 
Ṭūsī and Khājazāda were asked to comment on Ġazālī’s attack against the falāsifa, that is to 
evaluate the relationship between theology and philosophy.14 And this is exactly what Jāmī 
did in al-Durra al-fākhira. It would thus be most interesting to read his text in comparison 
with the results presented by his Ottoman colleagues. 
  Finally, there is a third way to interpret the Precious Pearl. It consists of considering 
it as a testimony of how a learned Muslim author of the 9th/15th century regarded and 
classified the metaphysical sciences. Apparently, Jāmī distinguished three of them, that is 
philosophy, theology and Sufism. This tripartition corresponds perfectly to the classical 
Islamic taxonomy of the sciences but it differs, at least in some way, from the expectations of 
modern scholars. Some of them have argued that in later periods, philosophy, Sufism and 
parts of theology collapsed in a certain manner. As a result, a new kind of philosophie 
islamique would have begun to flourish in the 12th century, linking rational cognition, 
spiritual experience, gnostic insight, and prophetic knowledge.15 Other scholars have 
advocated that philosophy and theology were subject to a process of integration in later 
                                                 
13 U. Rudolph, art. “al-Ṭūsī, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn”, EI², vol. XII (2004), 815a-b, and art. “Khodja-zāde, Muṣliḥ al-Dīn 
Muṣtafā,” EI², vol. XII (2004), 528a. The muḥākama gave rise to two writings which are preserved in several 
manuscripts and have meanwhile been printed: ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Kitāb al-Dhakhīra (Hydarabad, no date) 
and Khājazāda, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, 2 vols. (Cairo, no date). 
14 Up to now, the two texts have not been subject to a detailed and thorough analysis. For a general introduction 
see M. S. Özervarlı, “Arbitrating between al-Ghazālī and the Philosophers: The Tahāfut Commentaries in the 
Ottoman Intellectual Context,” in Islam and Rationality: The Impact of al-Ghazālī. Papers Collected on His 
900th Anniversary, vol. 1, ed. G. Tamer (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 375-397. Some particular topics raised in these 
texts are discussed in the proceedings of the colloquium on Khājazāda which was held in Bursa on 22nd-24th 
October 2010: Uluslararası Hocazâde Sempozyumu, eds. T. Yücedoğru, O. S. Kolooğlu, U. M. Kılavuz and K. 
Gömbeyaz (Bursa: Büyükşehir Belediyesi Yayınları, 2011); see in particular C. Karadaş, “Hocazâde’nin 
Tehâfüt’ünde Sebeplilik,” Uluslararası, 163-173; L. W. C. (Eric) van Lit, “The Chapters on God’s Knowledge 
in Khojazāda’s and ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Studies on al-Ghazālī’s Tahāfut al-falāsifa,” Uluslararası, 175-199, and A. 
Shihadeh, “Khojazāda on al-Ghazālī’s Criticism of the Philosophers’ Proof of the Existence of God. 
Uluslararası, 141-161. 
15 See among others H. Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, transl. by L. Sherrard with the assistance of Ph. 
Sherrard (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1993), introduction, as well as Ch. Jambet, Qu’est-
ce que la philosophie islamique (Paris: Gallimard, 2011), 62, 66-69 and 112-114. 
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centuries that changed both of them and made them a common intellectual enterprise.16 At 
first sight, Jāmī’s testimony appears to contradict these views completely. However, before 
situating and classifying his presentation in al-Durra al-fākhira, it seems appropriate to have 
a look into the details. The fact that he distinguishes philosophy, theology and Sufism as they 
had been distinguished, for instance, in the fourth/tenth century, does not necessarily prove 
that, at his time, all of them existed the same way, i.e. separately, as before. On the contrary: 
What Jāmī tells us about the three disciplines rather suggests that they have been subject to 
considerable modification, and it seems very promising to follow his reflections on this topic 
more in depth. 
  All in all, we may thus conclude that the Precious Pearl is a book worth examining. 
Despite it being a short text, it contains numerous pieces of information which can be 
valuable in different respects. However, before situating the book in its historical and 
intellectual context, we have to read it carefully and follow its argumentation step by step. 
 
III 
 
 According to Heer’s edition, the text of al-Durra al-fākhira can be divided into eleven 
chapters. All of them focus on one major problem: How can we describe God’s essence, His 
attributes and His acts? Yet Jāmī tries to distinguish the individual aspects of the problem in 
order to discuss each of them separately and in its own right. The list of topics examined by 
him runs as follows:17 
                                                 
16 See in particular the important publications by R. Wisnovsky, “The Nature and Scope of Arabic Philosophical 
Commentary in Post-Classical (ca. 1100-1900 AD) Islamic Intellectual History: Some Preliminary 
Observations,” in Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, eds. P.Adamson, 
H. Baltussen and M. W. F. Stone (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2004), vol. 2, 149-191, and 
“Philosophy and Theology (Islam),” in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. R. Pasnau 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), vol. 2, 698-706. 
17 The list follows the division of the text as suggested by Heer, Precious Pearl, 6-7; cf. Heer and Behbehani, 
Introduction to Jāmī, Durra, 7. 
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1) The nature of God’s existence and its relation to His essence, that is, is it superadded 
to His essence or identical with it? 
2) God’s unity and the necessity of demonstrating it. 
3) The nature of God’s attributes and their relation to His essence, that is, are they 
superadded to His essence or identical with it? 
4) The nature of God’s knowledge and the problem of attributing knowledge to God 
without compromising His unity or necessary existence. 
5) God’s knowledge of particulars and the problems encountered in attributing this type 
of knowledge to God. 
6) The nature of God’s will and whether His will is an attribute distinct from His 
knowledge. 
7)  The nature of God’s power and the related question of God is a free agent or a 
necessary agent. 
8) The question of whether the universe is eternal or originated together with the question 
of whether an eternal universe can result from a free agent or not. 
9) The nature of God’s speech and the question of whether the Qur’an is eternal or 
created. 
10) The voluntary acts of humans and whether they occur through the power of God or 
man. 
11) The emanation of the universe from God and the question of whether it is possible for 
multiple effects to result from a single cause. 
Of course, all of these chapters deserve to be discussed in detail. But we must confine 
ourselves to the topic which is at the centre of our workshop. This is treated in chapter 8, 
devoted to “the question of whether the universe is eternal or originated, together with the 
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question of whether an eternal universe can result from a free agent or not”, and so we are 
now going to examine the arguments given there.18 
 
IV 
 
Chapter 8 opens as follows: 
“It should be noted that the theologians and, indeed, the philosophers as well, agreed 
that what is eternal (al-qadīm) does not depend on a free agent (al-fāʿil al-mukhtār), 
because the act of the free agent is preceded by the intention to bring something into 
existence (masbūq bi-l-qaṣdi ilā l-ījād) and is of necessity contemporaneous with the 
nonexistence of that thing whose bringing-into-existence is intended (muqārin li-
ʿadami mā quṣida ījāduhu ḍarūratan). The theologians affirmed the free choice of the 
agent (fa-l-mutakallimūna athbatū khtiyāra l-fāʿil) and denied [the existence of] an 
eternal effect, whereas the philosophers affirmed [the existence of] an eternal effect 
(wa-l-ḥukamāʾu athbatū wujūda l-athari l-qadīm) and denied the free choice [of the 
agent]. As for the Sufis, may God sanctify their souls, they allowed the dependence of 
an eternal effect on a free agent (fa-hum jawwazū stināda l-athari l-qadīmi ilā l-fāʿili 
l-mukhtār) and combined affirmation of [the agent’s] free choice with belief in the 
existence of an eternal effect.”19 
Jāmī’s exposition is short but sophisticated. He argues on two levels: one of them 
describes the different views of the theologians, the philosophers and the Sufis; the other 
explains the theoretical background of their disagreement. Without doubt, the first level was 
well-known to every learned Muslim living in the 9th/15th century. In contrast, the 
                                                 
18 A short analysis of this chapter has already been given by N. Heer in a three-page paper entitled “Al-Jami on 
Whether an Eternal Effect Can Result from an Agent with Choice”. The paper, which was read at the 1968 
annual meeting of the Western Branch of the American Oriental Society in San Francisco and updated in 
December 2008, has never been published by Heer, but is accessible on his homepage 
(https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/4883). 
19 Jāmī, Durra, 28.6-12; I quote the English translation by Heer, Precious Pearl, 57. 
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explanations given on the second were not common knowledge but reveal Jāmī’s own 
reflections on the topic. As he explains, the different positions of the mutakallimūn and the 
ḥukamāʾ can be traced back to the same basic assumption. Both of them are convinced that 
what is eternal cannot depend on a Creator whose characteristic is to be a free agent and 
whose acts are not determined by necessity but proceed from his will. 
According to Jāmī, this assumption is erroneous. There is no proof that the idea of an 
eternal world is incompatible with the idea of a freely acting Creator. On the contrary: They 
correspond very well, and that is what the Sufis have recognized. The next question is thus to 
know how they substantiate their doctrine. On what grounds do they negate the assumption 
shared by the theologians and the philosophers? And what are the arguments given by them in 
order to defend the compatibility of the concepts of eternity and free agency? 
Jāmī gives two reasons, the first of which runs as follows: 
“They [i.e. The Sufis] said: Clear mystical revelation (al-kashf al-ṣāriḥ) has shown that [a]  
if a thing necessitates an entity through its essence (al-shayʾ iḏā qtaḍā amran li-dhātih) 
rather than through a condition superadded to its essence, which would be what is called 
‘other’ (ay lā bi-sharṭin zāʾidin ʿalay-hi wa-huwa l-musammā ġayran), or [b]  if that thing 
includes one or more conditions which are identical with its essence, such as relations and 
attributions (wa-in ishtamala ʿalā sharṭin aw shurūṭin hiya ʿaynu l-dhati ka-l-nisabi wa-l-
iḍāfāt), then it continues [necessitating] that entity and endures with it as long as its 
essence endures (fa-lā yazālu ʿalā dhālika l-amri wa-yadūmu lahu mā dāmat dhātuhu), as, 
for example, the Most Exalted Pen (al-qalam al-aʿlā), for it was the first thing created, 
there being no intermediary (wāṣiṭa) between it and its Creator, and it endures as long as 
[its Creator] endures.”20  
The argument is very clear: Jāmī refers to two logical concepts allowing him to 
suppose a necessary connection between God’s essence and His creation. One of them is 
                                                 
20 Jāmī, Durra, 28.12-29.1; Heer, Precious Pearl, 57. 
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implication or concomitance, in Arabic talāzum or iltizām; the other is inclusion, in Arabic 
taḍammun.21 In both cases, however, he avoids the technical terms used by the philosophers 
when referring to these concepts. Instead of talāzum, he simply says that one thing 
necessitates (iqtaḍā) another (see sentence [a]); instead of taḍammun, he uses the Arabic word 
ishtamala (see sentence [b]). Moreover, the whole argument is embedded in a kind of 
religious discourse. Apparently, Jāmī is eager to present the doctrine of the Sufis in a way 
familiar to them and appealing to a readership mainly familiar with the categories and 
expressions of religious language. 
In any case, the passage just quoted contains three Arabic expressions best explained 
this way. First: When introducing the concept of inclusion, Jāmī illustrates it by referring to 
the Most Exalted Pen (al-qalam al-aʿlā). This is certainly not an accidental example. The 
Most Exalted Pen was a symbol much appreciated in various Islamic traditions and by many 
religious scholars, among them the Sufis. According to the latter, it is to be understood as the 
first objective individualisation proceeding from the Creator and imprinting the forms of 
existence of all creatures upon the Preserved Tablet (al-lawḥ al-maḥfūẓ).22 Second: When 
introducing the concept of implication, Jāmī says: “If a thing necessitates an entity through its 
essence …” (al-shayʾ iḏā qtaḍā amran li-dhāti-hi) using the Arabic word amr in order to 
express what Heer has translated as “entity”. Of course, this is one of the possibilities to 
denote “entity” or “something” in Arabic, other possible ways being, for instance, šayʾ, 
mawjūd, or maʿnā. But I wonder if Jāmī, being careful with his linguistic choices, really chose 
it by chance. Amr is also the word many times used in the Qurʾān in order to denote God’s 
command (amr Allāh).23 And as a matter of fact, God’s command is a perfect example to 
convince religious scholars that there actually exists an entity which is immediately connected 
                                                 
21 This is the standard terminology as established by Avicenna; see e.g. Avicenna's Deliverance: Logic, 
Translation and Notes by Asad Q. Ahmed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 10-11 and Index. 
22 See e.g. Corbin, History, 55-56; an interesting example is to be found in Mullā Ṣadrā, The Elixir of the 
Gnostics/Iksīr al-ʿārifīn, A parallel English-Arabic text transl., introd. and annotated by William C. Chittick 
(Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2003), 8n.31 and 70-71n.55-57. 
23 Qurʾān 7:54, 10:3, 13:2, 14:32, 45:12 etc. 
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to God and necessitated through His essence. – Third: Despite being based on logical 
grounds, the argument is introduced as follows: “Pure unveiling”, or to take Heer’s 
translation: “Clear mystical revelation has shown”: afāda al-kashf al-ṣāriḥ. This is perhaps 
the most striking indication of Jāmī’s strategy of intertwining Sufi convictions and 
philosophical epistemology. The Sufis. as described by him, owe their knowledge to pure 
unveiling or clear mystical revelation. But what is unveiled to them corresponds perfectly to 
rationality and the rules of philosophical logic. 
This is confirmed by the second reason given by the Sufis in his text. It runs as 
follows: 
“It is as if they had adhered to what al-Āmidī said to the effect that the priority of 
bringing-into-existence by intention to the existence of the effect is just like the priority of 
bringing-into-existence by necessity [to the existence of the effect] (sabq l-ījādi qaṣdan 
ʿalā l-maʿlūli ka-sabqi l-ījādi ījāban). Just as the priority of necessary bringing-into-
existence is an essential rather than a temporal priority (sabq bi-l-dhāt lā bi-l-zamān), so 
also is it possible here for intentional bringing-into-existence to be contemporaneous with 
the thing intended but to be prior to it in essence (an yakūna l-ījādu l-qaṣdiyyu maʿa 
wujūdi l-maqṣūdi zamānan wa-mutaqaddiman ʿalay-hi bi-l-dhāt). In this way it is possible 
for a certain existent to be necessarily existent from eternity through the Necessary 
Existent in Himself even though He is a free agent (wājiban fī-l-azali bi-l-wājibi li-dhātihi 
maʿa kawnihi mukhtāran). Thus, the two are contemporaneous, although they differ with 
respect to essential priority and posteriority, just as the movement of the hand is 
essentially prior to the movement of the ring even though it is contemporaneous with it.”24  
It may be surprising that Jāmī is so bold as to refer to Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 
631/1233) in this context. As Heer has already noted,25 he does not quote him directly, 
referring instead to al-Āmidī's doctrine as presented by al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) in 
                                                 
24 Jāmī, Durra, 29.1-7; Heer, Precious Pearl, 57-58. 
25 Heer, Precious Pearl, 82. 
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his commentary on al-Ījī's (d. 736/1335) Mawāqif.26 Still, Āmidī’s views were controversial,27 
and above all, he was not a Sufi. So, how can he testify that the doctrine of the Sufis is the 
right one? As it turns out, however, this is exactly what made him attractive to Jāmī, because 
it fitted the strategy underlying the whole text of al-Durra al-fākhira. This consisted in 
demonstrating that Sufism, philosophy and to a lesser degree theology were not opposed to 
each other but, at least partly, convergent, if only we turn to the best arguments of the leading 
scholars. 
Yet, despite this strategy, the particular reason presented by Āmidī in our context 
raises a problem. As it appears, he accepted the description of God as acting in terms of 
“intention” (qaṣd). Now, intention was a category usually applied to human acts. For a long 
time by this point, Muslim theologians had made use of it in order to analyze the different 
aspects of our acting, that is our motives (dawāʿī), our intention, our will (irāda), our capacity 
of acting (istiṭāʿa, qudra ) and the act itself.28 So, how can this category denoting just one 
single aspect of our temporal and imperfect activities be applied to God? 
The question is crucial, and Jāmī takes his time to answer it extensively. He does so by 
presenting two objections raised against the doctrine of Āmidī both of which are immediately 
responded. The first objection including its response reads as follows: 
“It may be objected that when we consult our inner sense (wijdān) and properly observe 
the meaning of intention, we learn of necessity that it is impossible to intend to bring into 
existence something [already] existing, because intention must be contemporaneous 
                                                 
26 Al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, printed together with ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī, al-Mawāqif, 8 vols. (Cairo: 
Maṭbaʿat al-Saʿāda, 1907). The quotation is to be found in vol. III, 183.2-184.3. For al-Jurjānī's life and works 
see now Josef van Ess, Die Träume der Schulweisheit: Leben und Werk des ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Ǧurǧānī (gest. 
816/1413) (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2013). However, it seems questionable whether al-Āmidī actually held the 
doctrine attributed to him by al-Ījī and al-Jurjānī. Ḥasan Čelebī al-Fanārī (d. 886/1481), one of the later 
commentators of the Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, had doubts about that. In his Ḥāshiya to Jurjānī's Sharḥ, he quotes Saʿd 
al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390), who wrote in his Sharḥ al-maqāṣid that al-Āmidī had mentioned this doctrine 
in his Abkār al-afkār but only as an argument to be refuted; see Ḥasan Čelebī al-Fanārī, al-Ḥāshiya, printed 
together with ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī, al-Mawāqif, vol. III, 183.18-27. 
27 Gerhard Endress, "Die dreifache Ancilla: Hermeneutik und Logik im Werk des Sayfaddīn al-Āmidī," in Logik 
und Theologie: Das Organon im arabischen und lateinischen Mittelalter, eds. D. Perler and U. Rudolph (Leiden 
and Boston: Brill, 2005), 117-145: 128. 
28 Daniel Gimaret, Théories de l'acte humain en théologie musulmane (Paris: Vrin, 1980), 47-48, cf. 220. 
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(muqārin) with the nonexistence of the effect. Thus, the effect of the free agent must 
definitely be originated in time (ḥādith). – To this we should answer that the priority of 
intention to bringing-into-existence is like the priority of the bringing-into-existence to 
existence in that they are both essential priorities. Thus, their contemporaneous existence 
is possible because what [alone] is impossible is the intention of bringing-into-existence 
something [already] existing through a prior existence (al-muḥāl huwa l-qaṣdu ilā ījādi l-
mawjūdi bi-wujūdin qablu). In summary, if intention is a sufficient [cause] for the 
existence of the thing intended, then it is contemporaneous with it (wa-bi-l-jumlati fa-l-
qaṣdu iḏā kāna kāfiyan fī wujūdi l-maqṣūdi kāna maʿa-hu). If is not sufficient, it may 
precede it temporally, as is the case when we intend our acts (wa-iḏā lam yakun kāfiyan 
fa-qad yataqaddamu ʿalay-hi zamānan ka-qaṣdi-nā ilā afʿāli-nā).”29 
As it turns out, Jāmī’s response to the objection is a distinction. In accordance with 
Jurjānī, he argues that the word “intention” has different meanings when applied to man and 
when applied to God. In the case of man, intention is just one element among several others 
which altogether are necessary to constitute our acting. Taken in itself, it is not a sufficient 
cause for the existence of the thing intended by us. This is Jāmī’s explanation, and we may 
add that it actually corresponds to our experience as we often intend to do something without 
ever realizing it. In contrast to that, God’s intention is always effective. For him, it suffices to 
intend something, and the thing is done. Like any other of His attributes His intention cannot 
be but perfect and can never fail nor be restricted by something else. 
This idea is corroborated by the next passage in our text likewise consisting of an 
objection and its response. It stresses another aspect of the same problem but ends up with a 
solution quite similar to the one before. The text runs as follows: 
“It may further be objected that when we consult our inner sense and observe the meaning 
of intention, we conclude that the intention to bring something into existence (taḥṣīl al-
                                                 
29 Jāmī, Durra, 29.8-ult.; Heer, Precious Pearl, 58. The objection as well as the response are taken from Jurjānī, 
Sharḥ, III, 184.6-185.5. 
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shayʾ) and to effect it (al-taʾthīr fīhi) is inconceivable except when that thing is not yet in 
existence (lā yuʿqalu illā ḥāla ʿadami ḥuṣūlih), whereas to necessitate it (ījāb) is 
inconceivable except when it is in existence, even though its [cause] is prior to it in 
essence (bi-l-dhāt). This interpretation is self-evident and depends only on the proper 
conception of the meaning of intention and will. – To this we should answer that one who 
consults his inner sense perceives only his own imperfect, originated will and intention, 
not [God’s] perfect (kāmila), eternal will, and there is no doubt that the two differ 
qualitatively (wa-lā shakka anna-humā yakhtalifāni ḥukman). The former is not sufficient 
to bring the thing willed (al-murād) into existence, and the thing willed, therefore, lags 
greatly behind it (yatakhallafu l-murādu ʿanhā kathīran). The latter, however, is 
sufficient, and consequently the thing willed cannot lag behind it. How, then, can one of 
these wills be compared to the other?”30  
This point being clarified, there remains only one last question. How can we ensure 
that this is the appropriate interpretation of God’s attributes? And what is the reason that 
scholars such as philosophers, theologians and Sufis disagree about the right way to 
understand them and to describe their perfection? Once more, Jāmī’s answer is long and 
extensive. His elaboration on this point can be read as his final word on the problem of 
“whether an eternal universe can depend on a free agent”. At the same time, however, it is an 
opening to further reflections revealing more than anything before that our author adhered to 
the doctrine of Ibn al-ʿArabī. 
The last passage of chapter 8 reads as follows: 
 “It should be known that the attributes of perfection (al-ṣifāt al-kamāliyya), such as 
knowledge, will and power, can be considered in two ways (lahā iʿtibārān). One of them 
is to consider their relationship to the Truth, bearing in mind His Absolute unity (waḥdati-
hi al-ṣirfa) and the plane of His independence of the worlds. Considered in this way the 
                                                 
30 Jāmī, Durra, 30.1-7; Heer, Precious Pearl, 58-59. This part of Jāmī's argument is not taken from Jurjānī. 
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attributes are eternal (azaliyya) and everlasting (abadiyya), perfect with no trace of 
imperfection in them. The other is [to consider] the relationship of the uncreated 
quiddities (al-māhiyyāti al-ghayri l-maʿjūla) to His existential light (nūri-hi l-wujūdī) as 
analogous to the relationship of mirrors to what is impressed in them. It is the nature of 
the Manifest in His attributes of perfection (min shaʾni l-Mutajallī bi-ṣifāti-hi l-kamāliyya) 
to appear in accordance with the place of manifestation (al-majlā), rather than in 
accordance with Himself. Thus, when He manifests Himself in a certain thing, His 
attributes of perfection appear in it in accordance with that thing rather than in accordance 
with the Manifest. Imperfection (al-naqṣ), then, attaches to the attributes because of the 
imperfection of the place [of manifestation] (al-maḥall). – Therefore, when a mystic (al-
ʿārif) perceives these attributes through his inner sense (wijdān), he attributes the 
imperfection to the lack of receptivity in the place [of manifestation] (ʿadam qābiliyyat al-
maḥall) and ascribes them to God as complete and sanctified above any trace of 
imperfection. … One who is not a mystic (ghayru l-ʿārif), on the other hand, either 
ascribes these attributes to God as imperfect without differentiation of the planes [of 
existence] from each other (min ghayri tamayyuzi baʿḍi l-marātibi ʿan baʿḍin), or else 
denies them of Him completely. May God be high exalted above what the evil doers 
say.”31 
At the end, we have thus arrived at the doctrine of Ibn al-ʿArabī.32 Jāmī started his 
exposition by presenting the different doctrines of the philosophers, the theologians and the 
Sufis on a particular question but he finishes it by confessing that only the Great Master had 
been able to solve the problem at stake. As we have seen, the solution formulated by him is a 
                                                 
31 Jāmī, Durra, 30.8-31.6; Heer, Precious Pearl, 59-60. 
32 For Ibn al-ʿArabī's doctrine see, among numerous other publications, William C. Chittick, The Self-disclosure 
of God: Principles of Ibn al-ʿArabī's cosmology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), and Ibn 
ʿArabī: Heir to the Prophets (Oxford: One World, 2005). Another interesting document underlining Jāmī's 
adherence to Ibn al-ʿArabī's doctrine is his Risāla fī l-Wujūd which has been edited and translated by N. Heer, 
"Al-Jāmī's Treatise on Existence", in Islamic Philosophical Theology, ed. P. Morewedge (Albany: State of New 
York Press, 1979), 223-256. 
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kind of synthesis. It combines the idea of a free acting Creator with the idea of the eternity of 
world thereby connecting the views of the theologians and the philosophers which had always 
been supposed to be mutually exclusive. As a result, the Sufis as presented in the Durra can 
rightly claim to be the real verifiers (muḥaqqiqūn). They are the scholars who have access to 
pure unveiling and to logical reasoning which enables them to solve the problems raised by 
their colleagues in other disciplines. Or, to put it in Jāmī’s poetic language: True Sufism is the 
precious pearl reflecting the whole intellectual tradition of Islam and collecting all the light 
Muslim philosophers and theologians have been striving for. 
